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FOREWORD
The U.S. defense export system is in need of significant reform to reduce the impact of its core inefficiencies and weaknesses. The International Traffic
in Arms Regulations (ITAR) create serious problems
for the U.S. defense industry and thereby weaken U.S.
national security in several important ways.
While the ITAR is mostly successful in preventing
U.S. arms from being used against the United States
and its allies, the manner in which the ITAR regulations are enforced presents excessive barriers to U.S.
firms that impede their ability to compete in the global
defense market. These firms are important contractors to the U.S. military, and their success enables the
United States to maintain a technological and industrial advantage. Additionally, when U.S. allies choose
to purchase defense products from ITAR-free firms
based outside of the United States, U.S. Army interoperability with foreign forces decreases.
In order to maintain its strategic advantages, the
United States needs an arms export control system
that makes it easier for U.S. defense firms to supply
U.S. allies with defense products to support international security and U.S. foreign policy goals. The U.S.
Army plans to fight in coalitions but needs interoperable and well-equipped partners to best achieve
critical U.S. national security objectives.
			
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
The Barack Obama administration has launched an
Export Control Reform (ECR) program to improve the
regulations and procedures for controlling the export
of U.S. weapons as well as dual-use equipment and
technology. Emphasizing that international economic
competitiveness is a core component of national security, the administration’s stated aim is for the ECR to
increase U.S. exports and jobs as well as to strengthen U.S. national security and protect U.S. military
technologies.
The Obama administration began by establishing
an interagency task force that, unsurprisingly, concluded that the existing U.S. defense export control
system—the International Traffic in Arms Regulations—is overly complicated, excessively redundant,
and attempts to be too protective. The administration
has since been making reforms to U.S. export controls
to reduce impediments to U.S. foreign sales and partnerships, while increasing the benefits to U.S. national security through increased interoperability with
stronger allies.
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REFORMING U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS
REFORMS: ADVANCING U.S. ARMY INTERESTS
Richard Weitz
The Barack Obama administration has launched an
Export Control Reform (ECR) program to improve the
regulations and procedures for controlling the export
of U.S. weapons as well as dual-use equipment and
technology. Emphasizing that international economic
competitiveness is a core component of national security, the administration’s stated aim is for ECR to
increase U.S. exports and jobs as well as to strengthen
U.S. national security and protect U.S. military technologies. The Obama administration began by establishing an interagency task force that, unsurprisingly,
concluded that the existing U.S. defense export control
system—the International Traffic in Arms Regulations
(ITAR)1—is overly complicated, excessively redundant, and attempts to be too protective. The administration has since been making reforms to U.S. export
controls to reduce impediments to U.S. foreign sales
and partnerships, while increasing the benefits to U.S.
national security through increased interoperability
with stronger allies.
The White House has established the ambitious
goal of modernizing the entire U.S. ITAR bureaucracy.
Defense export reform is always difficult since it affects
a number of cross-cutting national security interests
such as nonproliferation, trade, jobs, and preserving
the defense industrial base. The Obama administration has achieved some progress in streamlining ITAR
licensing and registration process through executive
branch regulations as well as updating the U.S. Munitions List (USML). There have been several years of
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proposed rules that generally have been adopted following a few months of public comment. However,
even the administration acknowledges that progress
in ECR will remain modest and major ITAR defects
will remain unresolved without deeper changes to
the ITAR framework. These changes would require
major congressional action, which is unlikely in the
two remaining years of this administration given the
absence of a congressional consensus on the issue.
HISTORY
With suitable safeguards, foreign defense sales by
U.S. companies can serve important U.S. national security interests: they foster U.S. defense ties with allies
and partners, they enhance U.S. military technologies,
they increase operational and tactical interoperability
between the United States and other countries, and
sometimes between U.S. friends and allies that acquire
the same U.S. weapons systems. They also provide an
additional customer base for U.S. defense businesses,
whose health is important for sustaining U.S. military
primacy. For this reason, the Department of Defense
(DoD) has long supported U.S. foreign military sales.
U.S. export controls extend back to the 1930s—the
Neutrality Act of 1935 gave the Secretary of State the
right to license exports related to defense trade and
created USML—but it was really after World War II
that the U.S. Government adopted a comprehensive
system for controlling defense exports, laying foundations that have persisted to this day. Unlike after
World War I, which removed the most significant
threats to U.S. national security, World War II soon
saw the rise of a new powerful adversary—the Soviet Union. Washington policymakers simultaneously
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sought to prevent the Soviet bloc from stealing U.S.
military secrets while sustaining U.S. economic superiority as the foundation of U.S. military-industrial
might and to augment the capacity of U.S. friends
and allies against Soviet-backed threats through arms
transfers and other measures. The resulting Mutual
Security Act of 1954 and the Arms Export Control
Act (AECA) of 1976 served as the legislative basis for
ITAR, which falls under the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Title 22, Foreign Relations.2
ITAR still bears a distinctive Cold War-era stamp.
While contemporary debates over ITAR focus on economic concerns, the Act itself is preoccupied with (and
prioritizes) security considerations. AECA applies
broad U.S. national security strategies to govern U.S.
arms exports. USML has been constantly added to, but
not significantly subtracted from, since its creation in
1935. As a result, USML has regulated “military railway trains” and other obsolete items. The USML also
contains items that pose no significant threat to U.S.
security, such as M1A1 Abrams tank brakes, which
are identical to fire truck brakes that have no export
restraints.3
AECA provides for export control with several basic components: an export control list, a license system
for would-be exporters, and criminal penalties for violations of AECA.4 The Act regulates which arms are
manufactured and exported (through the Munitions
list) and who manufactures and receives the arms
(through the licensing process). The language AECA
uses to define what the U.S. President’s thought
process should be when considering an application
are instructive as to the Act’s strategic rather than
economic purpose:
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Decisions on issuing export licenses under this section
shall take into account whether the export of an article
would contribute to an arms race, aid in the development of weapons of mass destruction, support international terrorism, increase the possibility of outbreak
or escalation of conflict, or prejudice the development
of bilateral or multilateral arms control or nonproliferation agreements or other arrangements.5

In 1977, President Gerald Ford transferred Arms
Control authority from himself to the Department of
State in Executive Order 11958. The order charged the
Secretary of State to judge whether any “proposed
transfer will strengthen the security of the United
States and promote world peace.”6 The State Department drafted ITAR later that year to implement Ford’s
executive order. Though AECA includes certain provisions that concentrate decisionmaking power in
the executive branch, Congress included clauses to
retain some measure of control. During the 1970s,
rather than merely reacting to presidential decisions,
Congress tried to participate in the early stages of the
decisionmaking process by establishing “framework
legislation” that created a general procedural structure in which Congress received information through
reporting requirements and compelled consultation
through legislative vetoes.7 Under the original Gaylord Nelson-Jonathan Bingham proposal, the embryonic form of AECA passed in 1974, Congress enjoyed
extensive veto power over any proposed governmentsponsored sale of U.S. military equipment.8 Nonetheless, in recent years, the executive branch has dominated implementation of U.S. arms export policies.
Both AECA and ITAR stipulate that the President
(or State Department) must notify Congress 20 days
before any proposed changes are made to the USML.
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In 1983, the Supreme Court, in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, ruled the congressional
veto power unconstitutional, even while the rest of
AECA, which was meant to bolster that veto power,
was upheld. President Bill Clinton issued Executive
Order No. 12924 to maintain executive enforcement
of the 1949 Export Control Act (ECA) provisions after the original AECA lapsed.9 Rather than liberalize
U.S. arms exports, Congress sought to compel all recipients of U.S.-made weapons to adhere to U.S. arms
control policies. It enacted legislation requiring that all
countries having bilateral arms trade agreements with
the United States establish a similarly restrictive and
rigorous “regime” for arms control.10 Congress further
urged “that the President should work actively with
all nations to check and control the international sale
and distribution of conventional weapons of death
and destruction and to encourage regional arms control arrangements.”11
Faced with a globalizing world and rapidly advancing civilian-made dual-use technologies, the Ronald Reagan administration relaxed some export controls in the 1980s and authorized commercial satellite
(COMSATS) exports to France and the use of low-cost
Chinese rocket launchers. In 1992, Congress moved
all “dual-use” items (those having both civilian and
military applications) from USML to the less restrictive Commerce Control List (CCL).12 The Clinton administration relaxed controls on cryptography and on
the export of satellite technology, including exports to
China, by transferring its control to the less restrictive
Export Administration Regulations (EAR). However,
a lack of interagency coordination, bureaucratic infighting, and congressional pushback following the alleged leaking of sensitive dual-use rocket technology
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to China, blocked the administration’s broader export
reform agenda.13 As a result, the United States lagged
behind many other Western countries in relaxing its
arms export controls after the Cold War.14
The backlash from the Chinese episode presented a decade-long obstacle to major export reform.
In 1996, a Long March 3B rocket carrying the U.S.manufactured Intelsat 708 crashed immediately after
takeoff. It was the third launch failure in 3 years by
a Long March rocket. China invited U.S. engineers
to participate in a review to determine the cause of
the continued failures. Hughes, Loral, and other major aerospace companies identified the problem and
helped China strengthen its rocket launching capabilities—which also enhanced China’s ballistic missile
capabilities. The incident led to intense scrutiny by
Congress, which launched an investigation chaired by
Representative Christopher Cox. The resulting report
claimed that U.S. companies were more concerned
with profit than with protecting U.S. national security.15 Congress then enacted the Strom Thurmond
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 1999,
which required that space-related items, including all
satellites, were to be controlled as defense articles and
removed the President’s authority to change their jurisdictional status without congressional approval.16
Furthermore, NDAA changed the language of USML.
Whereas previously it only applied to those satellites
“specially designed or modified for military use,” the
new language includes: “communications satellites,
remote sensing satellites, scientific satellites, research
satellites, navigation satellites, experimental and
multi-mission satellites.” The change likely explained
why, from 1999-2008, U.S. commercial satellite manufacturers’ global market share decreased from 83
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percent to 50 percent.17 European countries began to
specialize in manufacturing commercial satellites that
they marketed as “ITAR-free.”
MAIN PROVISIONS
Currently, the United States has two lists of restricted export items; they define issues differently,
have different structures, and provide different levels
of specificity. The State Department maintains USML,
which covers all military and intelligence items from
complete aircraft and armored vehicles to ammunition
cartridges and specialized software. USML applies
primarily to U.S. defense contractors, but also covers
certain dual-use components such as aircraft landing
gears and marine propulsion units. ITAR establishes
the licensing policy for USML items. Meanwhile, the
Department of Commerce manages CCL, which covers dual-use technological equipment intended for
civilian use but whose sale may have security implications. CCL has Export Control Classification Numbers
(ECCN), an alpha-numeric code that specifies which
one of 10 categories and five product groups within
CCL the item belongs. CCL groups countries into categories determined by the criteria of bilateral relations
and security. EAR, administered by the Department
of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS),
establishes licensing policy for CCL items. DoD is an
influential player in both lists since other agencies rely
on its technical expertise. There are also many entity
lists of end-users, such as terrorist organizations and
states of proliferation concern, which cannot legally
import sensitive U.S. items.
DoD and State jointly determine the content of
ITAR. The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls
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(DDTC), a component of the State Department’s
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, administers the
regulations by creating a licensing process for military exporters and establishes a munitions list to define which articles fall under DDTC regulation and
which, by their omission, fall under the Commerce
Department’s less restrictive EAR, established by the
1949 ECA. For example, in principle, a military-grade
set of night vision goggles would be subject to ITAR
regulations, while a shipment of office supplies would
fall under CCL, based on EAR. Nonetheless, the tension between seeing defense shipments primarily as
a tightly guarded security concern or as an economic
opportunity fuels much of the discomfort and debate
surrounding ITAR today.
The State Department has four offices that work on
ITAR. The Office of Defense Trade Controls Management helps design, develop, and refine the processes,
tools, and activities related to arms export regimes.
The Office of Defense Trade Controls Licensing has
responsibilities for licensing and other defense trade
authorizations. The Office of Defense Trade Controls
Compliance handles potential violations of the law or
regulations. The Office of Defense Trade Controls Policy negotiates Defense Trade Cooperation Treaties.18
ITAR derives its legislative authority from Section 38
of AECA, under 22 USC § 2778, which authorizes the
President to control the export and import of defense
articles and services.19 The main force of ITAR is its
licensing process. All DDTC registered companies or
individuals need individual approval for each export
transaction.20 DDTC generally takes about 45 days to
process a license.21
ITAR contains 10 sections. Sections 120, “Purpose
and Definitions,” and 121, “USML,” represent the
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core of ITAR. USML is comprised of 20 categories of
defense-related items ranging from firearms to military vehicles. Through legislation, Congress can exercise the final say as to what items can be placed on
and removed from USML.22 Understanding the definitions employed by this legislation, some of which
are contrary to the vernacular connotation, is critical
to understanding how ITAR functions. Any commodity that has a potential military application is subject
to ITAR regulations as “defense articles” listed on
USML.23 The definition includes any “technical data
recorded or stored in any physical form, models,
mockups, or other items displaying technical data”
related to USML identified items, including encryption techniques.24 In fact, according to Category XXI of
USML, anything “not specifically enumerated in . . .
the United States Munitions List which has substantial
military applications and which has been specifically
designed, developed, configured, adapted, or modified for military purposes” is to be included in USML
and subject to ITAR at the discretion of the Director of
the Office of Defense Trade Controls Policy. This also
includes technical data and defense services, which
contains information relating to defense articles or
services.25
ITAR employs a very broad definition of the concept of an “export.”26 For example, since blueprints
and plans for defense-related items are considered
tantamount to the items themselves, ITAR can serve
as a regulator not only of the exchange of goods, but of
ideas as well. ITAR’s jurisdiction extends to information on how to make, maintain, or use defense items.
Furthermore, ITAR encompasses a broad definition
of how exports are transferred. Information that is
shared verbally or visually, such as on a computer
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screen, is considered an export. Intention is also irrelevant under ITAR. For instance, if a foreign national
overhears a conversation about a certain product design, that transfer is considered an export.27 The definition of “defense service” includes the instruction of
any foreign national, whether inside or outside the
United States, in the construction or use of defense
equipment.28 Anyone wishing to provide a defense
service must go through DDTC registration service,
just as would an arms exporter.29 DDTC registration
of any exporting company or freight carrier must be
renewed annually.30
The regulations become more intricate when involving a “foreign person.”31 In certain circumstances,
a transfer can occur entirely within the United States
but still be classified as an export since an ITAR-controlled commodity or information transferred to a
non-American employee of a U.S.-based corporation
would be considered an export and require a license.32
For instance, shipping technical information from
New York to a Canadian citizen living in Seattle and
working for a U.S. defense firm would constitute an
export, even though the information never left U.S.
territory. DDTC considers both the resident country
and country of origin of foreign citizens when reviewing export applications. For example, if a U.S. company wants to transfer information to a Sudanese-born
citizen of France, the license application would regard
the information transfer as an export to both Sudan
and France.33 Additionally, a company must have
State Department approval for not only the first transfer of an ITAR-controlled commodity or data outside
the country, but also for each subsequent transfer
even after the commodity or information has left the
United States.34 In contrast, a “U.S. person” is either an

10

American citizen, a lawful permanent resident of the
United States, or a “protected individual as defined
by 8 USC § 1324b(a)(3).”35 Unlike foreign persons, U.S.
persons do not face the same restrictions and are exempt from export licenses in some circumstances. The
State Department proposed a rule in May 2015 that
would require U.S. persons who work in defense related services for a non-U.S. company to register with
DDTC.36
USML enumerates the defense articles and services that are subject to ITAR regulations; the executive branch decides which articles and services are on
USML as defense-related items.37 The complete USML
list is located at 22 CFR 121.1. It covers “end-items”
as well as those partially completed items (such as
forgings, castings, extrusions, and machined bodies)
that clearly resemble and are identifiable as defense
articles. USML defines an “end-item” as a weapon in
a finished state that only requires ammunition, fuel, or
other energy source to make it operative.38 In theory,
the USML List is supposed to include only an item
that is “specifically designed, developed, configured,
adapted, or modified for a military application, and
does not have a predominately civil application.”39
This encompasses a range of military equipment, from
fully integrated advanced defensive or offensive systems to accessories for military equipment (everything
from night vision goggles to auto parts). The ITAR
list contains all items originally intended for military
use, regardless of the intended or declared use by the
recipient of an export.40 Items enumerated on USML
must be registered with the State Department’s Office
of Defense Trade Controls.41 In contrast, the jurisdiction of the BIS encompasses “dual-use items” that
have “both commercial and military or proliferation
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applications.”42 Factors that determine whether an
item is dual-use include its technical characteristics,
its destination, what the exportee (end-user) plans to
do with the item, and the other activities in which the
end-user generally engages.43
In practice, it is not always clear whether an item
falls under USML. In these cases, the commodity jurisdiction procedure is used to determine the status
of the item in question.44 This determination is made
by the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls upon the
submission of a form detailing the article or service,
and a history of the product’s design, development,
and use. The commodity jurisdiction process, rather
than categorically ruling on types of items, considers
each product individually, determining what the purpose of the item is using a very specific set of “form”
criteria.45 This procedure can be used for items that
are not on USML and items that are on the List but
whose designation seems ambiguous or obsolete. As
stipulated under Section 38(f) of the AECA, the Directorate must provide 30 days’ notice to Congress if it
sees fit to remove an item from the List.46 Even when
DDTC concludes that the item is not ITAR-regulated,
the commodity jurisdiction process often adversely
affects the trade of these exempt items due to the protracted review process.
To the frustration of foreign governments and
their companies, the extraterritorial application of
U.S. export controls is broad. The U.S. Government
claims jurisdiction regarding ITAR based on the nationality of the controlled defense article and of the
person involved in exporting or importing the item.
An item regulated by ITAR will be subject to U.S. export laws regardless of location or ownership. Regulation follows the part, not the person. Consequently,

12

production abroad of any end item that contains any
ITAR-controlled U.S. content is subject to these regulations. Unlike the EAR, ITAR has no de minimis exception. If a foreign made product contains any ITARcontrolled component or technology, no matter how
insignificant, the entire product is subject to ITAR.47
Even more controversially, when dealing with brokers of U.S.-origin defense articles, ITAR applies its jurisdiction to any person in the United States or anyone
who is otherwise subject to U.S. jurisdiction.48 ITAR
prohibits retransfer (also known as re-export) of any
item on USML by foreign persons without prior authorization. Consequently, if a foreign person wants
to retransfer an item controlled by ITAR to another
foreign person, both parties must have authorization.
This could mean that they need “Third Party Transfer
Approval” from the U.S. Government, must be named
on the export license, or be named as a party to a Technical Assistance Agreement or Manufacturing License
Agreement.
Section 122 outlines registration requirements,
submission of registration statements, registration
fees, notification of changes in information furnished
by registrants, and maintenance of records by registrants.49 At its core, Part 122 mandates that any person in the United States who manufactures or exports
defense articles or furnishes defense services must
register with the DDTC. A registration exemption is
offered for officers and employees of the U.S. Government acting in an official capacity, persons whose
business involves only the “production of non-technical data,” persons whose activities are licensed by
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and persons whose
“fabrication of articles [are] for experimental or scientific purpose.”50 According to ITAR, the purpose of the
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registration is to allow the U.S. Government to identify and account for those involved in the manufacturing and export of defense-related items. ITAR stresses
that registration does not confer any special rights or
privileges.51 Section 122.3 concerns the annual registrations fees, which are three-tiered. Each tier involves
different levels of payment for different types of entities. New registrants generally fall under the Tier 1
payment scheme, while registrants who have submitted and been approved for more than 10 applications
for manufacture or export within a 12-month period
would fall into the more advanced Tier 3 category.52
Additionally, registrants must also maintain highly
detailed records “concerning the manufacture, acquisition, and disposition” of all defense articles, defense
services, and technical data. Records must be either
on paper or in an electronic format that can be easily
converted to paper.53
Section 123 details how the export and import of
defense articles are to be managed. It specifies which
forms must be filled out prior to manufacture, export,
or temporary import of a defense article or service,
and provides for exceptions to this rule, which include
shipments with a total value less than $500, exports
of defense articles “in furtherance of a manufacturing
license agreement, technical assistance agreements,
distribution agreements, or arrangements for the distribution of items identified in Category XIII(b)(1).”54
Category XIII(b)(1), entitled Auxiliary Military Equipment, concerns military cryptographic systems and
their components.55 Section 123.16 includes numerous
other exceptions and details which can be found within the document. Section 123 also covers additional
topics such as exports and imports that cross the Canadian and Mexican borders (123.19), shipments by
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the U.S. Postal Service (123.24), the special licensing
regime for the export of commercial satellite equipment to U.S. allies (123.27), and exports to warehouses
outside the United States (123.7).56
Section 124 is similar to Section 123, but where Section 123 concerns the export and import of defense articles, Section 124 deals with the provision and manufacture of defense services.57 This involves the training
of foreign military forces, the design of a new type of
body armor, the maintenance and operation of a patrol boat, and even the destruction of an obsolete early
warning RADAR station. Generally, while Section 123
is concerned with the buying and selling of weapons
and information, Section 124 is focused on the development and use of weapons and information. Section
124.11 is worth noting in that it requires, pursuant to
the Arms Export Control Act, that:
certification be provided to Congress prior to the
granting of any approval of a manufacturing license
agreement or technical assistance agreement…for the
manufacturing abroad of any item of significant military equipment.58

The only exception to this is an emergency that requires immediate approval of the agreement for purposes of U.S. national security. Otherwise, approval
cannot be granted until 15 days after Congress has received the certification for the manufacturing license
or technical assistance agreement for North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) countries (including
Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea), and
30 days for all other countries.59
Section 125 concerns the export of technical data
and “classified defense articles.”60 Information in the
public domain is not subject to the licensing require15

ments enumerated in this section.61 Section 125.3
outlines how classified defense articles and technical
data are to be licensed and secured when transferred
out of the United States.62 Section 125 also includes
exemptions of general applicability. The exemptions
are more or less similar to those specified in Section
122. One interesting exemption is that technical data
“in furtherance of a contract between exporter and an
agency of the United States government” is exempt
from licensing so long as the contract provides for the
export of the data.63
Section 126 delineates general prohibitions on
where defense articles and services can be transferred.
As required by the AECA, ITAR sets forth exemptions and extra burdens for certain destinations in
accordance with U.S. security goals. Section 126.1 of
ITAR rules prohibits exports of controlled articles to
some two dozen “proscribed” countries. General prohibitions apply to Belarus, Cuba, Eritrea, Iran, North
Korea, Syria, and Venezuela. Exports are also prohibited to countries that are under a U.S. arms embargo,
including Burma, China, and the Republic of Sudan.64
Additionally, exports are prohibited to countries that
the United Nations (UN) Security Council has placed
under arms embargoes, as well as countries that the
U.S. Secretary of State deems to have “repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.”65
Defense articles cannot be transported on aircraft,
vessels, or vehicles owned or belonging to any of
these countries. Section 126 provides exceptions for
the proscribed countries. These must be determined
by the Managing Director of the DDTC and require a
“case of exceptional or undue hardship.”66 Exporters
from countries having a special relationship with the
United States also receive special consideration, and
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often more lenient treatment, in the licensing process.
Canada, the United Kingdom (UK), and Australia are
exempt from ITAR’s provisions since these countries
have treaties with the United States and their industries are considered a critical part of the U.S. defense
industry. The U.S. Defense Trade Cooperation Treaties with the UK and Australia reflect that 99 percent
of licensing applications between the United States,
UK, and Australia are approved.67 Special procedures
for arms exchanges also apply to some other NATO
members,68 but other long-standing U.S. allies still suffer. In 2010, South Korea voiced irritation about waiting for more than 2 years to update its U.S.-made P-3
Orion maritime patrol aircraft because of ITAR-related impediments.69 Even Israel, one of the most strategic U.S. allies, has started purchasing their COMSATS
from other countries due to ITAR’s licensing requirements and other ITAR-related frustrations.70
Section 127 enumerates what constitutes violations
of ITAR and defines consequences. Violations include
transfer of defense articles without a license, engaging in behavior that breaches the licensure agreement, and misrepresenting or omitting information
on a license application and other documents.71 ITAR
provisions include clearly defined civil and criminal
penalties. The Assistant Secretary of State for PoliticalMilitary Affairs is authorized to impose a civil penalty
that shall not exceed the maximum amount denoted
by 22 USC § 2778, 2779a, and 2780 for any applicable
violation of any of these sections; this penalty can be
in addition to, or in lieu of, any additional civil penalty that might be applicable to a given situation.72
On the criminal side, the liability standard applies if
an exportee makes a false statement or omits a material fact that should be stated in order to mislead; the
penalty is to be determined under the auspices of 22
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USC §2778(c).73 The penalties of violating ITAR can
be severe. Civil penalties are $500,000 per violation.
Violations can accrue easily since multiple shipments
of the same defense article without appropriate licensure are usually treated as multiple violations. Making a mistake is not a viable defense to civil charges
since penalties “can be imposed without showing any
intent to violate ITAR.”74 The criminal penalties for
ITAR violations are even greater: $1,000,000 and up to
1 year in prison per violation. Violations accrue in the
same way as civil penalties. Businesses convicted of
criminal violations are forbidden automatically from
exporting under ITAR, and possibly banned from
“selling to the US government directly or indirectly.”75
A company facing civil penalties can also be barred
from exporting U.S.-made defense articles and technology. Violations of ITAR can compound and multiple violations can result in a combination of several
civil and criminal penalties greater than $1,000,000.
For example, in 2013, Raytheon and Aeroflex were
fined $8 million each for ITAR violations, and in 2012,
United Technologies was fined $55 million. ITAR violations are also in the public record, which can inflict
further costs on violators in the form of lost business
and reputational damage.76
Section 128 establishes the administrative procedure and structure for implementation and operation
of the Arms Export Control Act. Since the decisions
and foreign affairs power inherent in the operation of
the AECA is “highly discretionary,” the AECA and
ITAR are excluded from review under the Administration Procedure Act.77 Section 128 establishes the
authority of Administrative Law Judges within ITAR
framework and outlines the mechanics of administrative proceedings, oral hearings, enforcement of
discovery rights during an administrative trial, hear18

ings, appeals, and other matters required for the functioning of the administrative legal system supporting
ITAR.78
Section 129 states that brokers must also be licensed by the DDTC to operate. A broker is defined
as “any person who acts as an agent for others in
negotiating or arranging contracts, purchases, sales,
or transfers of defense articles or defense services
in return for a fee, commission, or other consideration.”79 Exemptions to this licensure requirement
include employees of the U.S. Government and also
those of foreign governments and organizations
who are acting in an official capacity, and persons
who exclusively transport or forward freight. For
example an air carrier “who merely transports . . .
licensed USML items [is] not required to register.”80
The section details additional requirements for
brokers.
The final section of ITAR, No. 130, elucidates the
regulations surrounding fees, commissions, and political contributions. Corporations seeking licenses must
disclose to the DDTC any fees, commissions, or political contributions that the “applicant or its vendors
have paid.”81 Section 130 also details other information that must be provided by applicants and vendors
to the DDTC before receiving approval for the transfer
of defense articles and services.82
CRITICISMS OF THE EXISTING SYSTEM
Restricting the export of sensitive technologies
that provide the United States and its allies with a
military advantage over potential military adversaries or commercial rivals is an unobjectionably legitimate purpose for export controls. Professors Jonathan
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Caverley and Ethan B. Kapstein argue that “for 2
decades, the United States has dominated the global
arms trade, reaping a broad range of economic and
geopolitical benefits in the process.”83 Highly sophisticated technologies are a critical enabler of U.S. military capabilities and provide the United States and its
allies with unique capabilities against both conventional adversaries and non-state actors. It is widely
understood that “[t]he technologies that underpin
U.S. military and economic strengths continue to be
targets for theft, espionage, reverse engineering, and
illegal export.”84 However, this does not mean that
additional administrative burdens and micromanaging are necessarily the most efficient responses even
if historically they have been lesser priorities to those
implementing ITAR, who have focused on national
security considerations above all else.85 Inefficiencies
and other burdens risk sapping the economic strength
that provides the foundation for U.S. military power
and U.S. national security.
Although the United States has a larger share of
the global arms market than any other country, the
ITAR system likely makes some U.S. defense products
and services less competitive. Because of the controls
and restrictions, U.S. defense manufacturers cannot
sell to certain countries, and some foreign entities may
reject U.S. bids because of concerns over constrained
technology transfers or supply-chain disruptions.
Additionally, since many ITAR-controlled items are
available from foreign sources, export controls increase U.S. firms’ cost of doing business relative to
their foreign competitors.86 Obtaining all necessary
license documentation can take months, if not years;
even a repeat export of the same item to the same recipient requires a new license each time. The restric-
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tions also complicate U.S. joint ventures with foreign
partners by handicapping their access to U.S. technology. Multinationals respond by moving their production offshore, eroding the U.S. defense industrial base
and undermining export control regimes. Some firms
simply eschew the U.S. defense market altogether to
avoid these problems. ITAR-created overhead costs
also price U.S. companies out of the market for many
defense-related components.87 Small U.S. businesses
are major victims of these requirements since they
have less financial and human resources than large
firms to spend on hiring and training ITAR specialists
and meeting other ITAR-related costs.88
ITAR mandates an extra licensing step for any foreign or dual citizen involved in any step of the arms
export process including the exporting firm, any intermediate carriers, as well as the final destination. In
academic institutions, limitations on the acquisition
and sharing of information and innovations, such as
with foreign nationals and entities, can impede their
serving as laboratories for useful military technologies. There are also substantial monetary costs with
fulfilling ITAR obligations.89 Many larger institutions
have the resources and staff to negotiate the licensing
red tape, but smaller academic institutions that have
limited resources to devote to such nonacademic work
will more likely forgo it.90
A research group at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology worried that restrictions on dealing with
foreign nationals, which became more severe after
the September 2001 terrorist attacks, have discouraged international students from applying to U.S.
university engineering programs due to limitations
on which projects they could work.91 Some academic
institutions decline to compete for contracts requir-
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ing them to deal with ITAR restrictions. Furthermore,
foreign students or professors cannot participate in
some research projects, seminars, and talks involving
ITAR. In addition to limiting creativity, this restriction
can deter them from even studying or working in the
United States or lead foreign students who do obtain a
degree in sensitive but vital fields, such as aerospace,
to seek employment outside of the United States.92
ITAR’s “Fundamental Research Exception” aims to
relax restrictions on institutions doing:
basic and applied research in science and engineering
where the resulting information is ordinarily published and shared broadly within the scientific community as distinguished from research the results of
which are restricted for proprietary reasons or specific
U.S. Government access and dissemination controls.

However, universities believe that, in practice, its
exemptions are excessively limited.93 Ironically, a 2011
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) study
found that the licensing system for foreign nationals
was simultaneously excessively burdensome and insufficiently strict—both harmful for U.S. security.94
The higher operating costs due to ITAR have created a competitive advantage for foreign producers that
can offer ITAR-free options without the overhead costs
of complying with those regulations.95 Very public
episodes of legal action against foreign firms (like the
French satellite manufacturer Thales Alenia Space) for
violating ITAR have likely encouraged trends toward
ITAR-free product lines. Many European and Asian
manufacturers now proudly advertise their products
as ITAR-free.96 To be precise, an ITAR-free product is
a defense (or other) article that is designed not to need
any ITAR-regulated parts. Making an ITAR-free prod22

uct requires an entity to be aware of possible ITAR
jurisdiction at each step of the manufacturing process,
so a foreign entity must segregate U.S. involvement
from the creation of the product.
In the case of technical data, U.S. persons must not
be involved with any technical assistance or product
design.97 With few exemptions, a product can also become subject to ITAR by entering the United States.
The competitive advantage of ITAR-free products—
those using exclusively foreign-origin content and
that avoid U.S.-origin content to escape ITAR export
controls—is mostly anecdotal. It is unclear how pervasive ITAR-free products are and how much advantage
they enjoy over U.S.-origin goods subject to ITAR.
However, there are commonly cited examples. In 2011,
Lockheed Martin and Boeing were eliminated from
the bidding for a $10-billion contract to build medium
multirole combat aircraft (MMRCA) for the Indian Air
Force.98 The higher cost of the U.S. systems regarding
long-term maintenance and technology transfer may
have played a role. Each order of replacement parts
would need its own ITAR clearance, as would any
software or technology required to run the planes.99
Similar factors likely contributed to the Brazilian Air
Force’s decision to forego U.S.-built planes (and even
Swedish-built planes that use U.S.-made engines) in
a similar bidding competition.100 Other manufacturers and exporting countries gain an advantage from
offering products that eschew the bureaucratic hassle
of ITAR. The result is that the United States has less
influence over the global sale of militarily sensitive
technologies.
The lack of consistency or predictability caused
by the historical ITAR process increases the risks perceived by potential foreign investors and buyers of
U.S. goods. The broad discretion afforded the Com23

merce, State, and Defense bureaucracies in delegating,
suspending, and/or rescinding export licenses—as
well as their ability to establish broad license exception categories that permit a controlled item to be
exported under certain conditions without a transaction-specific license—forces foreign companies to incur additional risk in doing business with the United
States. Importantly, the Defense and Commerce Departments are not subject to the licensing standards
of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), which
tempers administrative discretion by mandating a
precedent-based decision process.101 The ITAR system
is widely considered to apply overly broad requirements to U.S. dual-use exports.102 This makes it more
difficult for U.S. entities to expand into foreign countries and increases their regulatory and compliance
costs.
Each year the U.S. Government reviews thousands
of applications and approves nearly all of them, the
majority of which are for end-user items the U.S. Government has previously approved. Even so, the ITAR
system forces U.S. and foreign partners to obtain separate approvals for almost every aspect of a weapon
system.103 Even though the majority of important technologies today incorporate dual-use items, defining
terms negatively (as ITAR does) introduces ambiguity
in what is covered by regulation. Firms that maintain
research and development facilities in foreign countries, or employ foreign persons domestically, must
compartmentalize access to information to exclude
nonauthorized persons. Because of the currently
broad wording of the technical data definition, theoretical access could be considered a breach of ITAR.
This compartmentalization increases the incentives to
not hire employees designated as foreign persons by
ITAR, which reduces the talent pool available for U.S.
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defense firms. ITAR also creates problems for U.S.
companies that want to cooperate with foreign entities
on new products. Foreign companies believe that the
ITAR process causes delays, discourages cost savings,
restricts information sharing, and complicates supply
chains.104 As a result, many foreign companies decide
that the cost of obtaining ITAR-regulated goods is not
worth the potential benefit. Consequently, these companies choose to invest in ITAR-free countries. Additionally, companies selling widely available technologies and goods will, everything else being equal,
seek out ITAR-free non-U.S. buyers. These activities
doubly harm U.S. national security by reducing U.S.
economic advantages and decreasing the impact of
U.S. export controls.
An example of how foreign companies will run
from ITAR and look for non-U.S. locations has been
seen in the space manufacturing industry. In 1999,
Congress transferred jurisdiction of space-related
equipment from the EAR under the Department of
Commerce to the more restrictive ITAR.105 The placing of space systems on Category XV of USML, with
all its associated licensing requirements, has made it
considerably more difficult for U.S. entrepreneurs to
enter the international commercial space market. The
production, transfer, and use of everything, including
launch vehicles, navigation equipment, ground control stations, and space-qualified photovoltaic arrays
is now illegal without appropriate DDTC approval.
This has dramatically increased the operating costs of
the U.S. commercial space industry and commercial
satellite owners at a time when the technology and
other capabilities to design rockets have spread well
beyond the United States and the Soviet Union.106 In
fact, the decision to move space related items from
the EAR to ITAR likely contributed to the subsequent
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dramatic fall in the U.S. market share of the commercial space industry—from 63 percent of the market
share before implementation of the stricter ITAR controls in 1998, to only 42 percent in 2002.107 In the geocommunications satellite sector, the U.S. market share
similarly fell from 73 percent in 1995 to 25 percent
by 2005.108 According to the Space Foundation, ITAR
most burdened the small, lower-tier contractors that
“are a significant source of . . . new technology and
innovation.”109 Moreover, ITAR regulations have dissuaded collaboration between U.S. firms and foreign
corporations.110 These changes have also made the
space industry heavily dependent on purchases from
the U.S. Government, which now accounts for about
90 percent of the industry’s sales.111 In the 1990s, many
of the specialized small parts used by international
satellite companies to make their equipment came
from the United States.112 With a new license required
for each order, however, foreign satellite companies
naturally decided to minimize their use of ITAR-regulated U.S. parts. Non-U.S. manufacturers increased
their coordination of satellite parts as seen in how European firms began to make products compatible with
Chinese Long March rocket launchers.113
To protect U.S. national security, the U.S. export
control system hampers international law enforcement by monitoring and regulating purchases of military technologies by inappropriate state and nonstate
actors. The contested jurisdictions and competing licensing requirements allow export violators to escape
prosecution by showing they received permission
from at least one entity. On occasion, two agencies
will review independently the same license application and render different decisions. Clever exporters
and malign actors will try to game the system through
forum shopping. Many assessments of how to apply
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the controls are highly subjective and rely on the “pornography” standard (regulators judge on the basis of
appearance). The large volume of licensing decisions
dissipates enforcement resources on items of little
military value while weakening protection of key U.S.
military and technological advantages. Unneeded
export restrictions impede U.S. military interoperability with foreign partners since they cannot obtain
the same or compatible weapons systems. Even allies
may worry about buying ITAR-controlled items since
they may encounter difficulties obtaining urgently
needed spare parts for vital U.S.-made defense equipment. The Pentagon has also expressed worries that
strict ITAR regulations are incentivizing producers of
defense products to invest in projects elsewhere, and
this is improving the military-industrial capabilities of
potential competitor countries rather than those of the
United States.114
At the advent of the Obama administration, the
U.S. export system presented a maze of institutions
with potentially contradictory requirements and enforcement agencies with overlapping authorities. It
employed two different control lists, was administered
by two different departments, involved three different
primary licensing agencies, as well as about a dozen
end-user screening lists. Information technologies (IT)
and systems, which were largely incompatible and
often inaccessible to each other, made it difficult to
integrate their coverage. The system also resulted in
a stove-piped licensing structure with frequent disputes over commodity and jurisdiction; the agencies
involved did not know when others were reviewing or
issuing licenses. In addition to USML run by the State
Department and the Commerce Department’s list of
dual-use items, the Treasury Department managed
economic sanctions on a wide range of entities. The
27

Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Energy Department had the special responsibility of regulating the
export of certain nuclear materials and technologies.
The ITAR process is infamous for its slow pace in
processing a massive number of license applications.
DDTC receives tens of thousands of applications annually and approval can take months.115 The average
time to approve technical assistance agreements increased from an average of 52 days in 2003 to 106 days
in 2006.116 In 2008, President George W. Bush signed
National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 56,
which mandated the DDTC to review and rule upon
a licensing application within 60 days of receiving the
application. Nonetheless, the chair of the International
Space Station Independent Safety Task Force has since
testified to the fact that the “ITAR restrictions and the
IP’s objections to signing technical assistance agreements are a threat to the safe and successful integration and operations of the Station.” He estimates that
ITAR-related restrictions lose U.S. space companies
an estimated $600 million in revenues each year. 117
Businesses cite the resulting lengthy time and uncertainties of securing a license as major problems
with ITAR. In a Booz Allen survey of U.S. industry
executives in May 2006, 85 percent of the respondents
“agreed” or “strongly agreed” with the statement
that “the unpredictable amount of time that it takes
my company to obtain an export license hinders my
company’s strategic decision making.” When asked
whether government regulators provide timely responses to requests for guidance, 64 percent either
disagreed or strongly disagreed. When presented
with the statement, “I can predict with confidence the
amount of time it takes for my company to obtain an
export license from my government,” 71.4 percent
either disagreed or strongly disagreed.118
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Many laws and regulations have been adopted
over the years on an ad hoc basis that urgently required streamlining. In 2010, Defense Secretary Robert
Gates correctly called the U.S. export control system
a “byzantine amalgam of authorities, roles, and missions scattered around different parts of the federal
government.”119 Before the Obama administration,
there had been little effort at harmonization and little
distinction between widely available, low-technology
items that could easily be obtained by foreign buyers
and the few most sensitive “crown jewel” U.S. technologies that warrant the greatest security often went
unprotected due to the system’s vast purview and
demands. The system has an overly broad definition
of what should be subject to export classification and
control, requiring the annual issuance of more than
100,000 licenses each year. The natural tendency of that
number is to increase since it is easy to get on a control
list (bureaucrats consider it safer to regulate than risk
being blamed for exporting dangerous items) but very
hard to get off (requires senior-level approval as well
as congressional notification). Since almost all license
applications were approved, this is a very expensive
and resource-demanding process. It also presents the
danger that, with such a dissipation of effort, the most
sensitive items are slipping through the cracks since
the lengthy list of controlled technologies taxes the
finite U.S. intelligence monitoring capabilities and resources. Agency actors can focus their energies on the
process—determining which list an item falls into and
which agency has jurisdiction—rather than whether
an item can be safely exported and to whom.
Some claim that ITAR’s national security benefits
outweigh potential economic costs. They cite numerous cases in which tight export controls have resulted
in the apprehension of illegal traffickers.120 Proponents
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also state that the United States is better able to retain
its technological advantage by instituting tougher
restrictions on the flow of weapons in and out of the
country, and thus stifling the ability of competitors or
third-party subversive elements to obtain sensitive
technology.121 Moreover, they claim that the government has discretion in licensing to further domestic/
international aims of the country, i.e., by leveraging
the issuance of licenses against perceived state interests in export controls.122 Moreover, despite the ITAR
process, the United States remains the largest weapons exporter in the world by far. Whether these perceived benefits appear collectively to outweigh the
quantifiable economic detriment they place on certain
export markets is questionable, but, of course, those
working to improve ITAR want to retain its benefits
while reducing its costs, resulting in a net gain for the
United States.
RECENT AND PROPOSED CHANGES
Proposals to reform the U.S. export controls have
been discussed for years, especially after the end of
the Cold War, but it was not until recent years that
a U.S. presidential administration made export control reform a priority.123 The administration’s export
reform drive has been based on several principles, as
outlined in an ECR 2010 work plan:
• focus only on most militarily significant items;
•	fully coordinate controls with multilateral regimes since export control typically requires
transnational partners to succeed;
•	unilateral controls must support a legal or foreign policy objective;
•	
lists must clearly identify controlled items
and be easily updated as technology emerges,
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matures, or becomes widely available (items
can “cascade” between categories, typically
from more to less restrictive);
•	
make licensing processes predictable and
timely;
• enhance enforcement capabilities; and,
•	facilitate exports of items promoting U.S. counterterrorism goals.
In their public statements, administration officials
have described export reform mostly as a national security goal with ancillary commercial benefits rather
than primarily as an export promotion or comprehensive deregulation initiative.
The reform process began as soon as the Obama
administration assumed office, appointed its national
security team, and established its national security
decisionmaking system. On August 13, 2009, Obama
directed the National Economic Council and the National Security Council to conduct a comprehensive
interagency review of the U.S. export control system
in order to craft a series of recommendations that better promoted U.S. national security and nonproliferation goals and begin implementing them.124 The President also directed the U.S. intelligence community to
conduct the first ever U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on export controls. Among other results,
this NIE concluded that the U.S. commercial sector,
rather than the military, was leading development
of the next generation of national security-related
technologies, which resulted in the administration’s
stressing the goal of supporting the U.S. defense industry as a foundation of U.S. power.125 Among other
adverse effects, ITAR restrictions on high-end exports
likely decrease U.S. comparative advantage in international trade. In a speech on April 20, 2010, Gates, who
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became a leading force for the new reforms, proposed
a four-pronged approach towards a more effective
and efficient export control system based on achieving four “singularities.” The first step was a single
unified tiered control list for both dual-use and munitions exports, based on three tiers of controls for different types of items, with the most stringent controls
on exports viewed as those most dangerous for U.S.
security interests:
•	Tier 1 items are weapons of mass destruction,
almost exclusively available from the United
States, that provide critical military or intelligence advantage and, therefore, should be the
most strictly guarded.
•	Tier 2 items are almost exclusively available
from multinational export regime partners or
adherents; they provide a substantial military
or intelligence advantage to the United States
or its allies, who would import these items
without a license.
•	Tier 3 items are widely available goods and services that provide only some military or intelligence advantage; this tier would include other
items controlled for national security, foreign
policy, or human rights reasons.
The second objective was to establish a single licensing entity that used standardized processes and
had jurisdiction over both munitions and dual-use
items and technologies. The administration has sought
to streamline the review process to ensure that export
decisions are consistent and to clarify where and how
to submit export license applications, as well as which
technologies and items are likely to be approved. The
third goal has been to create a single enforcement coordination entity that employed a frequently updated
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and consolidated list of banned end-users. The fourth
and last of these objectives would be to form a single
IT system that used a single online database for receiving, processing, and screening new license applications and their intended end-users.
The Obama administration has been employing a
three-phase approach, doing what it can on its own initiative while seeking to work with Congress to secure
authorization and funding for a more comprehensive
transition to a new system. In Phase I, the administration has tried to make immediate improvements and
establish the foundation for creating the new system.
Using its existing authorities, the administration has
developed a single license application form, established a single electronic gateway for exporters to access the licensing system, created a government-wide
consolidated end-user screening list, increased coordination among export control enforcement agencies,
and established Strategic Trade Authorization (STA)
for dozens of close allies and regime partners. The administration also launched a successful campaign to
secure Senate approval of the defense trade cooperation treaties with Australia and the UK, but has not
sought additional bilateral treaties, instead aiming
for comprehensive and universally applicable export
reform that the United States can implement through
its national legislation and regulations, albeit coordinated with foreign partners when possible.
In Phase II, which is currently underway, the administration aims to transition to a new U.S. export
control system by restructuring the two control lists
into identical tiered structures to reduce the quantity
of licenses required. They are using the same definitions on both lists and establishing a framework,
where, if the President determines it is warranted,
an item can be moved from the USML to the CCL,
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or it may be removed from the lists altogether. The
administration launched its efforts to reform the categories in the Munitions List by making the previous nebulous classifications more clear and distinct,
using “positive” definitions that define what items
fall within a category. Of special interest to the U.S.
Army, the Departments of Commerce and State chose
to start this process by converting Category VII of
USML, which covers Tanks and Military Vehicles, as
well as Category VIII (military aircraft). U.S. defense
exporters and foreign importers now can work with
a narrower list that excludes many items that previously had been considered defense ground vehicles.
Excluding clearly defined military vehicles and “specially designed” (as defined by the regulations) parts,
components, accessories, attachments, and related
technology and software, the remaining items in Category VII have been moved to the CCL. The State and
Commerce Departments now consider the completed
reclassification for Category VII as an example of how
to approach the other categories. The administration
has also sought to transition toward a single IT system
for export licensing and enforcement, remove or add
unilateral controls as appropriate, work with foreign
partners to change multilateral controls, and expand
enforcement compliance, but also outreach, with
domestic and foreign partners.
The proposed Phase III reforms require congressional legislation to complete the transition to a fundamentally new U.S. export control system. This new
system would merge the two control lists into one
single list, create a single Export Licensing Agency,
a single Primary Enforcement Coordination Agency,
and one enterprise-wide IT system for both licensing
and enforcement.
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The Obama administration has made progress
toward updating USML from a negative list, characterized by general and vague descriptions of defense
articles and design intent, to a positive list specifying
what precisely is controlled, increasing its resemblance to the current CCL.126
In terms of procedure, the Obama administration’s
ECR initiative has drafted many proposed new “final
rules.” Each final rule is effective 180 days after being
published in the Federal Register. Before each rule is
finalized, the Department of State publishes proposed
rules for public comment. The Department of Commerce publishes its own separate rules regarding the
CCL. Each comment period for the CCL lasts 30 days
and any entity may provide comments to that Department. After reviewing these comments, Commerce
may publish an updated proposed rule for additional
comment.
In early-2013, the administration published its first
final categories (for gas turbine engines, aircraft, classified articles, and miscellaneous articles). These revised Categories, VIII, XVII, XIX, and XXI of USML,
took effect in October 2013.127 On July 8, 2013, Commerce released additional amendments to Categories
VI, VII, XIII, and XX; these new final categories for
vessels, military vehicles, auxiliary military equipment, and submersibles took effect in early January
2014. In April 2013, the State and Commerce Departments modified the definition of “aircraft” in USML
to include only those planes that are used for military
purposes, which allowed the transfer of thousands
of items from USML to the less stringent CCL.128 The
already published final rules revise ITAR sections
on aircraft, gas turbine engines, technical data, naval equipment, military vehicles, “auxiliary military
equipment,” and submersibles.129 On January 2, 2015,
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the Departments of Commerce and State issued additional final rules revising USML Categories IV (launch
vehicles and missiles), V (explosives), IX (military
training equipment), X (protective personnel equipment), and XVI (nuclear testing equipment) which
took effect that summer.130 These 13 Munitions List
categories (of the 21 in total) that have been published
in final form encompass almost 90 percent of U.S. export licensing and more than $80 billion in actual exports each year, which generates almost 450,000 jobs
in the United States. The next priority for revising the
Munitions List is to publish final rules for satellites,
electronics, and chemicals.131 Accompanying this process, Commerce also created a new “600 Series” of
Export Control Classification Numbers for each CCL
category.132 As of mid-2014, 15 of 21 USML categories
have been updated. Figure 1, from the State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, illustrates this progress.133
USML

Category

No.

Description

Key Milestones
Effective
Date

Federal Notice (s)

Register

Final
Rule

Correction
Rule

Transition
End Date

I

Firearms

TBD

TBD

TBD

TBD

II

Artillery

TBD

TBD

TBD

TBD

III

Ammunition

TBD

TBD

TBD

TBD

IV

Launch Vehicles,
Guided Missiles,
Ballistic Missiles,
Rockets, Torpedoes, Bombs, and
Mines

7/1/2014

6/30/2016

79 FR 34

79 FR 36393

V

Explosives and
7/1/2014
Energetic Materials,
Propellants, Incendiary Agents, and
Their Constituents

6/30/2016

79 FR 34

79 FR 36393

Figure 1. USML Update Progress.
36

USML

Category

No.

Description

Key Milestones
Effective
Date

Federal Notice (s)

Register

Final
Rule

Correction
Rule

Transition
End Date

VI

Surface Vessels of
War and Special
Naval Equipment

1/6/2014

1/5/2016

78 FR 40922

79 FR 26

VII

Ground Vehicles

1/6/2014

1/5/2016

78 FR 40922

79 FR 26

VIII

Aircraft and Related 10/15/2013 10/14/2015
Articles

78 FR 22740

78 FR 61750

IX

Military Training
Equipment

7/1/2014

6/30/2016

79 FR 34

79 FR 36393

X

Personal Protective
Equipment

7/1/2014

6/30/2016

79 FR 34

79 FR 36393

XI

Military Electronics

12/30/2014 12/29/2016

79 FR 37536

TBD

XII

Fire Control/Sensors/Night Vision

TBD

TBD

TBD

TBD

XIII

Materials and Miscellaneous Articles

1/6/2014

1/5/2016

78 FR 40922

79 FR 26

XIV

Toxicological
Agents

TBD

TBD

TBD

TBD

XV

Spacecraft and
Related Articles

11/10/2014 11/9/2016

79 FR 27180

TBD

XVI

Nuclear Weapons
Related Articles

7/1/2014

79 FR 34

79 FR 36393

XVII

Classified Articles,
Technical Data, and
Defense Services

10/15/2013 10/14/2015

78 FR 22740

78 FR 61750

XVIII

Directed Energy
Weapons

TBD

TBD

TBD

XIX

Gas Turbine Engines and Associated Equipment

10/15/2013 10/14/2015

78 FR 22740

78 FR 61750

XX

Submersible Vessels and Related
Articles

1/6/2014

78 FR 40922

79 FR 26

XXI

Articles, Technical
Data, and Defense
Services Otherwise
Not Enumerated

10/15/2013 10/14/2015

78 FR 22740

78 FR 61750

6/30/2016

TBD

1/5/2016

Figure 1. USML Update Progress. (cont.)
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USML Update Progress.
The revisions of the Munitions List have been continuing throughout 2015. On May 5, 2015, the DDTC
published a proposed rule revising USML Category
XII (fire control, range finder, optical, and guidance
and control equipment), while the BIS issued a proposed rule detailing how items removed from Category XII would be controlled under the CCL 600
series. The BIS also proposed to expand controls and
create new ECCNs for certain software and technology related to night vision items. On June 17, 2015,
the DDTC published a proposed amendment to revise
USML Categories XIV (toxicological agents, including chemical agents, biological agents, and associated
equipment) and XVIII (directed energy weapons),
while the BIS again simultaneously issued a proposed
rule describing how articles removed from Categories
XIV and XVIII would be controlled under the CCL.134
Phase II of ECR will be complete when all 21 categories have been updated and approved, and when all
pertinent departments (State, Commerce, Defense,
and Treasury) have transitioned to a unified database.
The relaxation of restrictions on commercial space
exports has attracted much attention. Section 1248
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2010 directed the Secretaries of Defense and State
to conduct an assessment of the risks associated with
removing commercial satellites and related components from USML.135 The Departments of State and
Commerce issued rules regarding these items at the
end of 2011.136 The study, known as the 1248 Report
and completed in April 2012, showed that certain satellite-related technologies were inappropriately listed
under ITAR because these items were not critical to
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U.S. national security and did not contain technology
exclusively available to the United States.137 The report
provided a list of articles that could be transferred
from ITAR to the EAR due to their lower sensitivity.138
In October 2013, the White House issued a “Presidential Determination to Facilitate Satellite Reclassification” to transition export controls for certain satellites
and related items from USML to the CCL.139
The U.S. space industry has welcomed these
changes but called for further measures. For example,
to help small space companies, the Space Foundation
proposes eliminating the requirement for a license to
transfer defense articles between “U.S. and overseas
divisions of the same company . . . provided all sites
are ITAR-compliant.”140 Another solution is to create a
database that allows exporters to “see which customers have been granted access to certain categories of
ITAR-controlled exports and which customers require
greater scrutiny for certain transactions.”141 This step
would save exporters time and money by allowing
them to determine more easily which customers were
ITAR-compliant and would also incentivize foreign
companies to improve their compliance to avoid
obtaining a negative rating in the database.142 These
solutions might also be applicable to other ITAR-controlled industries.
Most of the work done on these parts of USML
has been to eliminate “catch-all” clauses with the
result that all items that are not specifically affirmatively listed on USML move to the more lenient Commerce EAR list.143 One primary aim of the changes is
to decrease the stringency of rules that affect small
machine parts that could have multiple uses. Furthermore, the USML has reclassified commercial satellites
(COMSATS) as civilian goods, thus, they have become
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ITAR-Free.144 Section 1261 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 returned to the
President the power to determine which regulations
govern the export of satellites and/or satellite-related
articles. On May 13, 2014, DDTC and BIS established
final interim rules for satellite export control revisions
and less-sensitive items were moved from USML to
CCL.145 The rules implemented a proposal to establish
four new ECCNs that would fall under Category 9 of
the CCL. They define the controls of EAR for items that
the President deems are unnecessarily controlled under Category XV of USML and that do not fit into any
current ECCNs. ECCN 9A515 pertains to “specially
designed” parts, components, attachments, and accessories as well as ground stations and spacecraft; 9B515
pertains to associated inspection, production, and test
equipment, in addition to the “specially designed”
components; 9D515 pertains to associated software;
and 9E515 pertains to associated technology.
Further rules came into effect in late-2014 that
amended Category XV of USML, which includes
spacecraft and associated articles, and Category IV,
concerning “spacecraft-launching vehicle integration
and launch failure analysis services.” Other changes
include adapting modifications to the specific export
controls for satellites and satellite launches and adding telemetry data to the group of exclusions from
technical data.146 Certain articles have been transferred
from USML to CCL Category 9, such as some remote
sensing satellites, planetary rovers, and the majority
of commercial communications satellites, as well as
associated technologies, components, and parts. Also
newly subjected to the EAR are:
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data transmitted to or from a satellite or spacecraft,
when limited to information about the health, operational status, or function of, or measurements or raw
sensor output from, the spacecraft, spacecraft payload,
or associated subsystems or components,147

labeled as EAR99. Although commonly less strict than
ITAR, satellite products, technology, and software on
the CCL will still be regulated by end use, end-user,
and country-based controls through the EAR. Remaining under the export control of ITAR in USML’s Category XV are items with high-level sensors and those
that have space-related military functions, as well as
the majority of manned spacecraft.148
The changes notably depart from ITAR’s “seethrough” rule, as items on the new ECCN 9A515 still
fall under the control of the EAR, even if “exported,
re-exported, or transferred in-country with ITAR-controlled items integrated into and included as integral
parts of the EAR-controlled commodity.”149 COMSATs new control under 500 series classification numbers of the CCL help to avoid this rule, which forces
manufacturers to tell all customers that their product
is a defense article, establishing that it will always
be controlled as a U.S. munition. However, the rules
still include a restriction to embargoed countries like
China. Critics worry that a new see-through rule will
be developed under the EAR, which will have a similar effect of causing foreign manufacturers to avoid
American technology. Given Europe’s negative history with ITAR’s see-through rule and the European
Union’s recent promotion of space collaboration with
the Chinese, the European space industry will likely
seek to avoid any new see-through rule under the
EAR by avoiding the use of U.S.-origin items.150
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The Obama administration also wants to address
the problem that the U.S. Munitions List often blurs
the lines between the separate lists of regulated products managed by both the State and the Commerce
Departments, potentially confusing a contractor or
exporter about where to apply for licensing. For example, many items on USML were listed as subject to
ITAR if they were “specifically designed” for military
applications. The lack of clarity in the phrase “specifically designed” was brought into sharp relief in the
2009 circuit court case of United States v. Palungun, in
which a man exported riflescopes without a DDTCissued license. DDTC deemed him in violation of the
AECA, but his conviction in a lower court was overturned on appeal. The reviewing judge found that
the DDTC’s decision that the riflescopes constituted
a regulated defense article was arbitrary, and the rule
(written into the AECA) that the decision could not
be subjected to judicial review was inappropriate.151
The term “specifically designed” applies to devices or
software designed for defense usage that do not constitute a defense article on their own (a large category,
given how many modern defense items are built with
small parts and run on complex software).
Because the “specifically designed” distinction remains in several parts of USML, the first newly published rules sought to update the definition and clarify
the boundary lines between Commerce and State in
order to facilitate the transfer of items from USML to
the CCL.152 The new definition employs a “catch and
release” approach, whereby the first part of the definition may capture an item as specially designed for
military use and the second part may release it provided the item does not meet specific parameters. The
goal is to allow the more flexible rules of the EAR to
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apply to less sensitive items, while the State Department focuses its resources on more sensitive items and
on eliminating ambiguity regarding the scope of each
set of regulations. Since the “specifically designed”
designation is often very unclear, the ECR has tried to
limit the number of times where it appears, opting instead to describe defense articles in terms of their size,
shape, lethality, or other factors. Under the new interpretation, if an article is built with the intent of helping another item on USML achieve its intended aims,
it is considered “specifically designed” for that purpose.153 The second part of the definition offers a set of
caveats, essentially saying that “a commodity should
not be ITAR controlled if it has a predominant civil
application or has performance equivalent (defined by
form, fit, and function) to a commodity used for civil
applications.”154 These definitional changes likely will
streamline the process of applying for licensing, eliminate the need for commodity jurisdiction requests,
and save defense companies valuable time.155
On January 15, 2014, the Obama administration issued Presidential Policy Directive 27 to ensure that U.S.
conventional arms transfers support the U.S. national
security and U.S. foreign policy goals. Yet, 13 months
later, the State Department released a new policy
concerning U.S. exports of military unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) and their technologies.156 The new
policy will assess on a case-by-case basis the proposed
sale of U.S.-made military and commercial unmanned
aircraft systems (UAS) and will require recipient nations to agree to “end use assurances” that they will
use such purchases only in accordance with U.S. security interests and international law. Although permitting the export of Category I UAS on “rare occasions,”
the new policy reaffirms the U.S. commitment to the
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Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which
maintains a “strong presumption of denial” against
the sale of Category I UAS capable of delivering a
payload of at least 500 kilograms with a range of 300
kilometers.157 This separate approach reflects the fact
that the administration does not view UAVs as typical
conventional weapons, but wants enhanced oversight
of them to ensure a disciplined framework in which
the United States can exercise restraint in sales while
enhancing bilateral ties with allies and trusted foreign
partners.158 Thus, the new U.S. drone policy, while accelerating decisionmaking and benefitting particular
firms, may restrict some UAV sales.159 Conversely,
those countries participating in the Wassenaar Arrangement, a voluntary group of 41 nations including
the United States that aim to promote international
security in transfers of conventional arms and dualuse technologies, have since liberalized the sale of
commercial UAVs outside of the United States. Due
to this ruling, commercial UAVs possessing a range of
less than 30 minutes will no longer require an export
license from the Department of Commerce, which will
amend the EAR.160
Beyond the reforms to the Munitions Lists, some
progress already has been achieved in facilitating the
employment of foreign nationals. New regulations enacted in 2011 facilitate approval of the transfer of defense articles to dual and third country nationals. Before this reform, a company needed to seek approval
before allowing either a dual or third country national
to work with defense articles. A “dual country national” is one who is a national of their employer and
a national outside of the United States, while a “third
country national” is one who is neither a national of
their employer nor the United States. One of the main
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issues stemming from this former regulation was that
companies had to question potential employees as to
what their national origin was, which could violate
labor and human rights laws if an employee was not
hired due to their national origin. This new rule aimed
“to replace the current restrictions based on nationality with restrictions based on concrete risk factors to
mitigate the likelihood of unauthorized transfers.”161
As long as an entire transaction is under the proper
ITAR licensing process, the presence of foreign nationals in companies carrying out the transactions no
longer needs separate approval.162
Treatment of nationals of the NATO countries,
Australia, New Zealand, and Japan is even more favorable under the new rules.163 The only two requirements regarding dual and third country nationals
under this new law are that “the transfer takes place
completely within the physical territory of the country where the end-user is located and the end-user has
effective procedures in place to prevent diversions to
unauthorized destinations.”164 The second requirement forces companies to create a screening program
to prove to the DDTC that their dual and third country
national employees do not have substantive contact
with proscribed countries, unless that employee has a
security clearance from their government in which the
substantive contact rule would not matter. The DDTC
defines substantive contact as:
regular travel to such countries; recent or continuing
contacts with agents, brokers and nationals of such
countries; continued demonstrated allegiance to such
countries; maintenance of business relationships with
persons from such countries; maintenance of a residence in such countries; receiving salary or other continuing monetary compensation from such countries;
acts otherwise indicating a risk of diversion.165
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In May 2015, DDTC proposed to amend section
22 CFR §126.4(a) to permit “permanent” exports for
official use (existing regulations permit “temporary”
imports and exports under conditions of “urgency”)
by U.S. Government agencies working outside the
United States. This proposed rule would help alleviate
some confusion that U.S. Government contractors face
when exporting ITAR-controlled products, technical
data, and software to U.S. Government customers that
happen to be located outside the United States or to
their American employees in foreign offices that work
as “contractor support personnel” for U.S. Government customers situated overseas.166 Furthermore, in
June 2015, the Department of Commerce and the Department of State narrowed the definition of a digital
export. The transfer of data is no longer considered an
export if the data is unclassified, secured with encryption and cryptographic modules, and not stored in a
country listed on the Country Group D:5 profile (Bureau of Industry and Security [BIS] countries subject
to U.S. arms embargoes as identified by the State Department) or in the Russian Federation.167 Yet, critics
claim that the new rule will burden U.S. and foreign
companies with establishing a system to ensure that
their employees do not violate the substantive contact
rule.168
One recommendation is to grant the individual,
agency, or country a comprehensive blanket license
once they have received an ITAR license. This option
would be geared towards the academic community
so that universities do not have to apply for a new
license—and wait for an approval—whenever they
want to start a new project.169 An “academic” license
might be developed that would apply to an entire
foreign country and allow its students to study and
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work in the United States without having to apply for
a separate license for themselves. Another proposal
is that once a country, agency, or company receives a
license for one item, then that license could apply to
the same items in the future.170 All these recommendations would benefit not only the license recipients but
would also ease the DDTC’s workload, lowering its
costs and allowing licenses to be issued faster.
Perhaps the most ambitious ECR attempt to
streamline the process is to create a single U.S. arms
export licensing agency in order to reduce wait times
for export licenses (which can be over a month) and
decrease general confusion about licensing.171 Unlike
other countries that export defense articles, the U.S.
arms export regime is controlled by three agencies:
DDTC, BIS, and the Treasury Department’s Office of
Foreign Assets Control. They have overlapping functions when it comes to ITAR. A GAO report found that
only one out of the six major foreign defense exporters
they studied had more than one agency handling defense exports, thereby avoiding the problem of overlapping jurisdiction.172 The U.S. multiagency approach
is a creature of another era, when products were designed with only a military or a civilian intent.173 Another common problem is that the different agencies
often do not communicate with one another regarding
which license requests have been accepted or denied,
leading to surprises and misunderstandings.
In 2010, the Obama administration recommended
that a “single control list, enforcing agency, information technology system, and licensing agency” be
implemented to make all exports, especially ITAR
products, more efficient.174 It is unclear whether a
single licensing agency is necessary to solve this problem; perhaps better information technology (also on
the ECR agenda) might do just as well.175 On June 3,
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2015, the Departments of Commerce and State published notices in the Federal Register proposing rules
to harmonize the definitions used in ITAR and EAR
as a step toward establishing a single shared export
control list.176
On June 16, 2011, the Bureau of Industry and Security published a new Strategic Trade Authorization
(STA) licensing exception to expedite transfers to as
many as 44 countries that pose limited risk and to stimulate coordination among allies.177 The STA authorizes
the export, re-export and in-country transfer of certain
dual-use items and less significant munitions items,
predominantly parts and components, on the CCL to
allies and friendly countries deemed as posing a low
risk of unauthorized or impermissible end uses.178 Although they are exempt from acquiring a specific license for these transactions, they must meet enhanced
compliance requirements to prevent the re-export of
covered U.S. EAR goods to unauthorized end-users.
For example, they must certify that they will adhere
to U.S. export control regulations, such as obtaining a
U.S. license to export these items to non-STA eligible
countries, and meet notification and consignee statement requirements.179 The License Exemption STA applies to two groups of countries. The STA authorizes
the first group, consisting of 36 countries, to export,
re-export, and make in-country transfers of products
and technologies that are controlled for multiple reasons, including national security, nuclear nonproliferation, regional stability, crime control, chemical or
biological weapons, and “significant items.”180 The
remaining eight countries are authorized to export,
re-export, and make in-country transfers that are
subject only to national security controls.181 Items excluded from License Exception STA include encryption, certain pathogens and toxins, certain gas turbine
48

engine-related software and technology, certain types
of missile technologies, and crime control items.182
The Department of Commerce estimated that the STA
will remove the need for tens of thousands of export
licenses and retransfer authorizations annually.183
After struggling with its IT system, the BIS replaced
all of its computers in 2010 in order to facilitate the
transition to one single IT system. The U.S. Export Systems (USXPORTS) database of the DoD is expanding
to include the State Department and the Department
of Commerce.184 As these three departments begin to
use the same platform, the White House explains that
“the three largest departments involved in export licensing will be on a single IT system, enabling them
to better administer the licensing process and ensure
that decisions made by the different departments are
fully informed.”185 Designed to rationalize the licensing review process among the various agencies, it will
serve as a foundation for the desired single licensing
agency following completion. First, the administration wants USXPORTS to be adopted for internal communications. The administration has also created a
single license application form.186 Instead of applying
for multiple licenses, Special Comprehensive Licenses
(SCL) authorize companies who have established License Control Programs to conduct multiple exports.
The administration hopes that in the future it will realize not only a single license review platform, but also a
system for single submission and review.187
DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY
VISION 2020 STRATEGY
The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA),
the office responsible for initiating Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) with other governments, recently issued
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a new strategy aimed at rationalizing the FMS process
and strengthening coordination with partner nations.
A major component of the policy is the Vision 2020
strategy, which pushes Congress to streamline certain
provisions under the Arms Export Control Act that
permits government sales to allied countries, but restricts the transfer of such products to a third country.
As NATO attempts to improve coordination through
initiatives for joint development and the merging of
assets and technology, this restriction is becoming a
problem. It hinders the United States from being able
to coordinate and support nonmember partner nations that need military assistance.188
DSCA states that Vision 2020 aims to promote “a
whole-of-government effort to build and maintain
networks of defense relationships that achieve U.S.
national security goals.” Its three main goals are to
synchronize “security cooperation activities,” meet
“customer expectations,” and ensure “the effective
and efficient use of community resources.” Regarding
the synchronization of security cooperation activities,
it strives to lead coordination throughout the Security
Cooperation Enterprise (SCE) by enabling effective
decisionmaking and breeding adaptability in its procedures. In terms of meeting customer expectations,
it stresses the need to cater its solutions to specific
customer concerns in order to stay competitive in the
international market and employ complete strategies.
Pursuing efficiency and effectiveness, the DSCA highlights the need to use all the tools at its disposal and
best manage declining resources.189
In order to avoid the roadblocks to effective cooperation brought on by the Arms Export Control
Act, DSCA is making certain structural changes to its
organization. For example, it has created integrated
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regional teams that coordinate with the Pentagon’s
geographic combatant commanders in order to identify the specific needs of allied countries so that they
can proactively address them. These reforms have
been driven by tightening U.S. and foreign budgets,
as well as increasing competition in the global marketplace, raising consumer pricing, and improving
quality demands. While the United States historically
has approached FMS conservatively, the evolving international market has forced them to adapt.190 DSCA
Senior Strategic Analyst Clayton Holt explained: “We
had to be more responsive and provide our customers
with a more responsive organization with more transparency, more visibility, so people could understand
what’s happening.”191The new approach aims to make
the government more proactive in supporting the defense needs of non-NATO foreign partners.192 Still, it
is only a modest step in the process and other reforms
must come as well.193
EXPORT-IMPORT BANK
A related issue that could impact export control
reform is the future role of the Export-Import (Ex-Im)
Bank, whose future is under debate in Congress and
beyond. The administration wants to renew its charter, but opposition in Congress to the Bank is strong,
while some proponents want the Ex-Im Bank to return to its earlier mission of funding U.S. arms sales.
The Bank is the official U.S. credit export agency offering loans to finance U.S. exports. The Bank’s website states that it “enables U.S. companies—large and
small—to turn export opportunities into real sales that
help to maintain and create U.S. jobs and contribute to
a stronger national economy.”194 It is an independent
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agency and functions through the Export-Import Bank
Act of 1945, a renewable charter. Congress establishes that financing by the Ex-Im must have assurance
for repayment and stresses that it is to complement,
rather than compete, with private money. The Ex-Im
bank also follows the international guidelines laid out
by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development. In fiscal year (FY) 2013, the Bank authorized 3,842 deals of support, resulting in $37.4 billion
in American exports. As of March 31, 2014, the Ex-Im
declares a default rate of 0.211 percent and claims that
since 1992, it has a 50 cents on the dollar recovery rate
for defaults. Most of its work revolves around direct
“loans, loan guarantees, working capital finance, and
export credit insurance.” Normally, sales to military
purchasers and defense or military goods are ineligible for financing, but there are some exceptions.195
Until the end of the Cold War, the Ex-Im Bank
supported U.S. national security endeavors. As World
War II escalated, President Franklin Roosevelt used
the Ex-Im bank to support the new Soviet Union and
to counter Japanese economic control in China and
growing German influence in Latin America. The
Bank bought foreign government notes, such as those
from Mexico and Nicaragua, seeking to keep these
states politically and economically tied to the United
States.196 The Bank financed close to $500 million per
year in arms sales during the Cold War.197 The executive branch also used the Ex-Im Bank to avoid foreign
aid restrictions, which brought criticism from both
sides of the political sphere. Republicans opposed issuing loans to build plants in Soviet bloc states, while
the left was outraged when the Bank evaded congressional restrictions on military assistance for Vietnam.
They also complained when the Bank funded both
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sides of a conflict, such as India and Pakistan.198 Congress eventually ended the Bank’s direct arms export
role by creating a distinct defense loan guarantee program that is hardly ever used.199 Nonetheless, a major
component of the debate over the Bank’s reauthorization is the effect that changes will have on U.S. arms
and defense exports. Citing an already large defense
industry, opponents of the Bank believe that U.S. arms
exporters do not need further financial support, while
advocates for the Bank, often defense and aerospace
companies themselves, state that the Bank is essential
for allowing U.S. exporters to compete effectively with
major foreign powers.
Critics of the Ex-Im believe it inappropriately tries
to choose winners and losers when deciding whom to
support.200 Detractors argue that the Bank represents
an example of unjustified, inefficient corporate welfare by giving wealth to major corporations that are
politically connected.201 American taxpayers must assume the risk of these loans, while the reward goes
to corporations.202 Opponents believe that companies
that utilize the Bank’s programs could, if they are
good at what they do, easily obtain alternative private
sector funding. Furthermore, U.S. firms that do not receive as much help from the Ex-Im Bank sometimes
must compete with foreign companies that do.203 Critics claim that issuing direct subsidies would more efficiently support U.S. arms sales.204 They also complain
about the distortions that result when unsubsidized
exports struggle to obtain funding because the Ex-Im
Bank encourages lenders to focus on subsidized projects. Thus, contrary to supporters of the Bank, foreign
governments are not threatening the health of U.S.
exports, but rather the American government itself.205
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Supporters of the Ex-Im Bank contend that letting the bank’s charter expire would be a poor strategy and unilaterally disarming since many other
countries have agencies that finance exports.206 The
Ex-Im Bank’s greatest benefactors and often greatest
supporters are the U.S. defense and aerospace giants
such as Boeing. The Bank helps them increase exports
without having to conduct all the demanding financing work.207 Proponents also believe that the Bank
can help the United States to remain competitive in
the international nuclear energy market, which will
support U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals.208 Some
want to enlarge the Bank’s mandate to renew its authority to fund major arms deals.209 A priority would
be offering loans to less developed countries in Latin
America, the Middle East, and Africa, where Russian
and Chinese arms dealers are most active.210 Critics
condemn the idea that the Bank should finance arms
deals and should, instead, support other U.S. foreign
policy goals. Among other concerns, they worry that
the Ex-Im Bank is controlled not by the Departments
of State or Defense but by major, politically connected
corporations who would prioritize their corporate interest over the national interest.211
EFFECTS AND OBSTACLES
If implemented as intended, an improved export
reform system would benefit many U.S. exporters as
well as several manufacturing sectors and countries.
Fewer controls, clearer criteria, and more rapid licensing would eliminate some export barriers and produce additional benefits. A standardized export control system for U.S. technologies and manufacturers
would make U.S. products and services more compet-
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itive by making the licensing process clearer and more
efficient. The rationalization of export controls would
make the United States more attractive to foreign direct investment because such companies would find
it easier to export products from the United States.
U.S. businesses could leverage new technology transfer flexibility for more advantageous joint ventures.
In terms of specific goods and services, all exporters
will benefit from reduced jurisdictional conflicts and
streamlined government oversight, but some sectors
will benefit more than others. Many items on USML
would be moved to CCL, while many items would be
exempt from all controls. Restrictions could decrease
on marine navigation systems, hydraulic parts, civilian microprocessors, computerized tools, construction
equipment, and medical devices. Automobile and
electricity generation equipment manufacturers could
avoid the burden of obtaining government approval
to export each part. U.S. national security should improve if U.S. law enforcement and intelligence entities
were able to focus more on protecting only the most
sensitive U.S. technologies and exports. The expanded
opportunities for U.S. arms exports would increase
interoperability with allies and partners that use the
same military equipment.
The reforms would reduce the cost and delivery
time of arms sales to foreign countries that otherwise
must obtain individual export licenses for all spare
parts and weapons subsystems. U.S. friends and allies
would find it easier to purchase logistic support from
U.S. arms manufacturers. For example, 20 percent of
the export permits issued by the State Department in
the past decade were for British customers and more
than 90 percent were approved. The new STA allows
for license-free export, with restrictions on re-export-
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ing, of many dual-use items to two groups of countries. First, most European countries, plus Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, and Argentina, can import almost all items on the CCL that
do not require a license by statute. Second, Albania,
Hong Kong, India, Israel, Malta, Singapore, South Africa, and Taiwan are eligible for all items on the Wassenaar Arrangement Basic List. Meanwhile, countries
like China and Saudi Arabia, whose governments are
unpopular in the United States, would further benefit from depoliticizing the export approval process,
which would decrease opportunities for U.S. domestic
lobbies to oppose certain exports such as the sale of
F-15 fighters to Saudi Arabia, the nuclear cooperation
agreement with India, or the sale of communications
routers to China.
Many U.S. investment projects in China depend on
technology transfer and co-production with Chinese
corporations; obtaining U.S. Government approval is
difficult. India would also benefit from export control
liberalization, especially with regards to dual-use materials. U.S. electrical and aviation goods account for
40 percent of total U.S. exports to India. The Indian
Space Research Organization currently faces difficulty
in gaining access to sensitive aerospace items and software. Foreign partners could more easily purchase
middle- and lower-tier military equipment necessary
for routine maintenance, research and development,
and training. Such items could include satellite navigation guidance systems for precision-guided munitions, gas turbine engines for armored fighting vehicles, night vision gear, armor piercing ammunition,
and nonlethal crowd suppression weaponry, which is
also available from U.S. allies like France, Israel, and
the UK.
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Human rights groups and others have already
raised significant concerns about the potential of these
reforms to erode the current laws that were established to keep U.S. defensive assets out of the hands
of terrorists, torturers, and belligerents. They believe
that the decontrols will make it more likely that dangerous items will reach such recipients. Furthermore,
they expect that the resources needed to move large
numbers of items from USML to the CCL may divert
attention to oversight of items still on USML. Critics
also fear that the new STA exemption may increase
the amount of sensitive items sent to allies and friends
that could become available to hostile third party actors.212 The administration argues that it is “a misconception that ECR is simply a decontrol effort that will
result in U.S.-origin items being more widely available
for use in human rights abuses. In fact, the opposite is
true.” According to the administration, for example,
even for the STA countries, the United States is relaxing controls only on less-sensitive items and strengthening the audit trail for any sales of these articles. In
addition, for items removed from USML, “the eased
licensing burden will be balanced by an increase in the
enforcement resources focused on the export of items”
moved to the CCL. Furthermore, the administration
claims that it is expanding exports controls to items on
the CCL that had not previously been subject to UN
and U.S. arms embargoes.213
U.S. industry hopes that the reforms will continue
to remove items from ITAR jurisdiction, resulting in
greater predictability in the licensing system, reducing delays, and making U.S. exporters more competitive.214 For example, the reforms have been welcomed
by the Aerospace Industries Association, whose members believe that the changes will strengthen oppor-
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tunities for U.S. companies to sell space and satellite
products internationally and level the playing field for
the global market of such products.215 As of 2015, the
average time to process an ITAR license request had
fallen to about 25 days.216
Even so, while moving items from ITAR to the
EAR presents visible action, sometimes the regulatory burden on U.S. exporters or foreign importers is
not significantly eased. For example, changes in the
EAR regulations created a new category for many
aircraft parts moved off of USML, called the “600
Series.”217 This new category requires more stringent
licensing than other EAR items, which some exporters complain makes it hard to distinguish from previous ITAR-mandated licensing processes.218 Although
Gates and other officials have claimed that creating a
single list of restricted national security exports would
streamline the U.S. arms export process, the new distinctions (“tiers”) within the list could engender more
problems with arbitrary distinctions. Moreover, with
so many different satellite and spacecraft items being
transferred from USML and ITAR control to CCL and
EAR control, space exporters and manufacturers may
find it challenging to establish how their products fit
into the new, complex, and shifting control system.
They must master the regulations and licensing procedures of the DOC, which differ sharply from those
of the DDTC.219
On November 9, 2010, Executive Order 13558
created the new Export Enforcement Coordination
Center (E2C2), a first step toward building a single
clearinghouse for handling exports and coordinating
licensing. The new center will coordinate the efforts of
eight U.S. governmental departments and 15 federal
agencies to detect, prevent, disrupt, investigate, and
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prosecute violations of U.S. export control laws by increasing the sharing of intelligence and law enforcement data.220 The E2C2’s mission aims to create:
a more robust whole-of-government approach to enforcement that ensures interagency coordination, promotes multiagency collaboration, minimizes the duplication of efforts and strengthens the link between
law enforcement, the intelligence community, and
export licensing entities.221

On November 20, 2014, the Department of Commerce launched a web search tool for the Consolidated Screening List (CSL), a streamlined collection of
nine different “screening lists” managed by the Commerce, State, and Treasury Departments. Altogether,
CSL holds the names of more than 8,000 firms and individuals subject to U.S. export regulations, sanctions,
or other restrictions—U.S. companies are generally
prohibited from doing business with them.222 However, creating a single export licensing and screening
agency would require legislation by a Congress still
dissatisfied by the perceived problems of the most recent consolidation of executive agencies, the Department of Homeland Security, in 2003.223 It is unclear
how beneficial a single licensing agency would be for
U.S. arms exporters. It would likely reduce agency
overhead and save money, but it may not accelerate
the issuing of export licenses. Would a single agency,
tasked with twice the work and twice as complicated
a job as the DDTC and EAR, be more efficient? Probably not, though such an agency would also make the
export process more transparent and organized.
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Although the ECR should save the Pentagon money
in the long run, the current budgetary crisis is impeding the reform’s implementation. To take one recent
example, the DoD Better Buying initiative promotes
the principle of design for exportability by mandating
the use of “defense exportability features” in choosing weapons systems. However, the debate continues
over who should pay for the short-term costs, which,
in the long run, should increase U.S. military exports,
raise interoperability, and reduce costs through larger
production runs and other efficiencies.
The U.S. system of separation of powers presents
major institutional barriers to export control reform.
ECR Phase III will require major legislative changes
to consolidate the reorganizations. Many different
congressional committees have some authority over
U.S. exports, and, at times, the different congressional
committees have favored diverging approaches. One
consideration that can often unite them is limiting the
discretion of the executive branch and constraining
near-term spending on reforms that will only have
long-term payoffs. The Congress has not fully supported the administration’s reform plan, and no consensus has arisen behind the legislation required for
wholesale reform. Even within the executive branch
bureaucracy, the export reform issue pits U.S. national
security against economic agencies.
The final objective of the reform process is to amend
every USML category, but the Obama administration
is unlikely to complete revisions of the list by the time
it leaves office in January 2017. The other envisaged
reforms may take considerably longer than updating
the Munitions List, raising the obvious question of
whether the next administration will be as committed
to reforming ITAR as the Obama administration, as
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well as whether it will seek the same export reforms or
proceed in a different direction.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The U.S. Army should welcome efforts to reform
the U.S. arms export process. A more competitive
and vibrant U.S. defense industry can provide better
military technologies to the Army and its allies. U.S.
economic strength, reflecting general U.S. defense industrial capabilities, is the foundation of U.S. national
power. U.S. arms sales reduce the Army’s overhead
costs, maintain U.S. defense production lines and a
highly skilled and trained workforce essential for resetting and reconstituting the force, expand the range
of foreign defense suppliers, promote interoperability
between U.S. and foreign military forces, and make
important contributions to U.S. international account
balances and national security.
The current regulations adopted during the Cold
War are outdated in a global environment characterized by the proliferation and constant evolution of
weapons technology. ITAR has long impeded U.S.
defense firms seeking to compete in an increasingly
global defense market. Although the United States
has a larger share of the global arms market than any
other country, reductions to the market, such as those
caused by ITAR, impede U.S. Army goals. These impediments make it more difficult to sustain core U.S.
defense technological and industrial advantages, reduce U.S. Army interoperability with foreign partners
that purchase non-U.S. weapons, and create other
undesirable effects for the U.S. Army and other U.S.
military services.
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Reform would allow the U.S. export managers to
concentrate more on the national security concerns of
the greatest importance, rather than wasting time and
resources on insignificant considerations. By replacing a redundant, complex, and inefficient system, the
United States would better secure U.S. national security interests, apply limited resources mostly to the
most important threats, strengthen interoperability
with allies through expedited and expanded access to
U.S. weaponry, and bolster the U.S. defense industrial
base by decreasing incentives for foreign companies
and militaries to stop using U.S. exports. The creation
of a single arms export list with “tiered” controls, with
the most stringent controls applied only to the most
sensitive exports, along with a single U.S. arms exportlicensing agency to manage the process by adjudicating license applications and enforcing these decisions,
would reduce the time to approve export licenses and
decrease the general confusion about licensing.
The Quadrennial Defense Review directs DoD, including the Army, to promote innovation, prepare to
fight with partners as well as alone, ensure that critical
skills are retained, and be able to mobilize its capabilities for sustained conflict. Whatever the result of the
current effort, it will be essential for future U.S. presidential administrations, members of Congress, and
U.S. Army leaders to treat export control reform as a
living and likely unending process, and to take into
constant account any changes in threats, technology
and other critical variables.
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